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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF MONTICELLO,
Plaintiff/ Respondant,
Case No. 88034-3-CA
vs,

Priority #2

LEE CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgement and Order
of the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court
County of San Juan, State of Utah,
the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, presiding.

LEE CHRISTENSEN, Pro se
Appellant
225 Hwy 30 East
Evanston, Wyoming
-mailingc/o Norman Christensen
965 South 15th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84.105
LYLE ANDERSON, Attorney*
for the City of Monticello
Respondant
P. 0. Box 275
Monticello, Utah
84535

i

« fsstsi U'sm fL#V

FEB 161988
COURT OF APPEALS

-page i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page i

STATEMENT OF FACTS

page one

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

page two

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

page two

SUMMARY OF RESPONSE TO RESPONDANT'S ARGUEMENTS

page three

RESPONSE TO RESPONDANT' S ARGUEMENTS

page four-eight

CONCLUSION

page eight-nine

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

page nine

-page oneSTATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr, Christensen will ammend his statement of facts to reflect
the fact that the City of Monticello never did enter "defendants
exhibit B" (a letter from the Department of Public Safety),
into evidence, as Monticello has claimed in it T s Brief.

The

defendant, Mr. Christensen, has been denied his status as impecunious
and therefore he can not supply transcripts to the Court, as
he honestly has no funds with which to pay for them, therefore,
the record will have to suffice.

Mr. Christensen's memory is

that the evidence was entered, but if it was not, as Mr. Anderson,
(Monticello) claims, Mr. Christensen is willing to ammend his
facts to reflect that.

That being the case, there was no other

evidence entered into the record to support the claim that Mr.
Christensen1s license was ever suspended.
of this state is not a crime.

Driving on the highways

Monticello agrees, with Mr. Christ-

ensen did enter an Abstract of his Wyoming license (defendant's
exhibit A.) showing his staus "clear".

He did therfore, successfully

refute the charge of Driving while Suspended.
However, this is an issue which has far reaching CONSTITUTIONAL
issues,

Namely, State's Rights.

Further it appears to be an

issue of "first impression" in the state of Utah.
The residency issue has never come up before now, and this
is not the proper time to raise it.
Mr. Christensen did file his brief in this Court timely
as is evidenced by the Clerk's stamp showing filing on December
16, 1988.

If it was not mailed to Monticello until the 20th

(which Mr. Christensen doubts) it is not damaging to his appeal
«--.- nr„\
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-page twoSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal rising out of

a criminal case, in which

a Constitutional issue is raised, giving this Court Jurisdiction
under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules
3 and k of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1) The City of Monticello has introduced no evidence that
Mr. Christensen's license was suspended on the date in question.
(2) The state of Utah has no power or authority to suspend
or revoke a license granted by the state of Wyoming (Art. IV § 1
U.S. Constitution,)
(3) Under the "reciprocal agreements" onlynhome states"
have the authority to suspend* or revoke the licenses granted
by them, and there is a proscribed procedure to accomplish it.
Utah did not follow that procedure, and Mr. ChristensenTs license
was never suspended, making him innocent of violating UC 412-28.
(4.) The State of Utah must give full faith and credit to
the priviledges granted by the state of Wyoming.

-page threeSUMMARY OF RESPONSE TO ARGUEMENTS SET OUT IN RESPNDANTS BRIEF

The arguments that are presented in this appeal are definately
of a Constitutional nature, as well as a challenge to the Validity
of the statute (UC 41-2-28) in it!s current application.

This

issue is a case of first impression in the State of Utah and
as such the Utah Court of Appeals does have the proper Jurisdiction.
The State of Utah has the power to suspend the licenses
of residents of the State of Utah, who are licensed within the
state of Utah, but the only way in which they can suspend the
license of a resident of another state is to contact the licensing
authority of the state in which the individual has residence
with notification

of the violation, so that the home jurisdiction

can take the appropriate steps to suspend the license.
Wyoming, Mr. Christensen!s home state, was not at the time
in question a party state to the "Driverfs License Compact",
but it did have in force itfs own reciprocal agreement (WS 31-9-204)
Had Utah properly suspended Mr. Christensenfs license been properly*
'guapeird^dr, the state of Wyoming would have been aware of it
and would have taken the steps to suspend Mr. Christensen!s
license.

Defendants exhibit A ( Abstract of Wyoming License)

clearly shows this was not done.

Utah has no power of it!s

own over the licenses and priveledges (or acts) of

Wyoming.

If it did there would be no purpose in the "DriverTs License
Compact" or reciprocal agreements of any kind.
If the proper procedure had been followed, Mr. Christensen?s
license would have been properly suspended, but it wasn f t, and
such arbitrary action on the part of Utah is a direct violation

-page fourof Wyoming's rights as a soveriegn state of the Union.

RESPONSE TO ARGUEMENTS SET OUT IN RESPONDANT'S BRIEF

I.

The defendant/appellant, Mr. Christensen, has repeatedly

challenged the Constitutionality and validity of the Statute
he was charged with (UC 41-2-28), as it relates solely to this
case.

Mr. Christensen understands that he is not a law-trained

individual, and that his arguements may not be as clear or concise as an attorney's might be, however his callange has always
been clear.

The issue is and always has been an issue of State!s

Rights, which is clearly constitutional in nature, and in the
validity of this particular statute in the instant application.
Mr. Christensen, realizes that UC 4-1-2-28 may be both Constitutional
and valid in the proper application, but in this issue it is
neither valid or Constitutional.

The state of Utah, here, assumes

that it can arbitrarily suspend a priviledge or license granted
by the state of Wyoming, without following the proscribed procedure
set out to inform the state of Wyoming of the violation, so
that Wyoming could actually suspend Mr. Christensenfs license.
The "Driver?s License Compact" is very clear when it states
that only the "home state has
of a non-resident.

the power to suspend the license

Mr. Christensen ha s in every Court presented

an Abstract of his Wyoming license, showing that it was not
only valid at the time of arrest, but at least THREE years previous
to it, thereby challenging the validity of the statute.

Further

he has always maintained that Utah has no power to suspend
his license.

Therefore he has raised a Constitutional issue.

-page fiveTo assume that Utah has such power over acts of another state
would be in direct violation of Article IV §1 &2 of the U. S.
Constitution.

Further if Utah is found to have such power,

what would stop a state from suspending, annulling, or withdrawing
mariage licenses, divorces, property deeds, or any other act
of another state?

It was for that very reason that thf£ particular

article was included in the Constitution.
Therefore, Mr. Christensen has raised the Constitutional
issue in more than a "pro forman manner.

Further Mr. Christensen

beleives that this is a case of First Impression in the State of
Utah, and for these reasons bel#£ves this case is properly before
the Court.

II.

In the Respondantfs Brief, Mr. Anderson of the City of

Monticello, has tried to raise the question of Mr. ChristensenTs
residency in the State of Wyoming.

Monticello does not claim

that this issue was ever raised before, and indeed it was not.
This is not the proper time to raise it.
If the Court allows themVto raise it now, Mr. Christensen
claims residency in Wyoming under the definition to BlackT s
Law dictionary, 4-th Edition.

Mr. Christensen has merely provided

the court with his fatherTs address for the Court?s convenience
due to his often transient life-style.
no evidence

Montiicillo has produced

to the contrary, nor can they.

The defendant's reliance on case law he presented is not
"misguided" as Monticello claims.
The statute quoted in State vs. French 117 NH 285, (at

-page six786, 787) " Any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle
in this state after his license to operate has been suspended
or revoked shall be guilty of a misdeanor..."; is almost verbatim
in the Utah Code

41-2-28, "Aperson whose operator's license

has been suspended or revoked, who...drives any motor vehicle...
while that license is supended or revoked, is guilty of a crime.."
Neither is the definition of license expanded in the definitions
found in UC 41-2-1(n), to meet the criteria set forth in the
"French" case to qualify for conviction.

The "French" case

is explicit in that it states that the definition of "license"
would have have to be expanded to include "non-residents operator's
priviledge" in order to support conviction of "Driving on a
suspendoa^ed License".
Indiana vs. Churchill 388 NE 2nd 586 does not draw the
distinction Monticello says it does, nor does the City of Monticello
provide any case law, or statutory law to support it's claim
that the legislature has removed the distinction between "license"
and "priviledge".
Further the rule of law in State vs. Roy, 176 A2d 66,
which Monticello claims is is significant here is not as significant as Monticello claims it is.

Mr. Christensen, claims

no "special Priviledges", nor any "greater priviledges" than
those originally granted him by the state of Wyoming.

It should

be remembered that Mr. Christensen had a license issued by the
by the State of Wyoming, long before the alleged "suspension"
by the State of Utah.

He did not obtain it in an attempt to

evade the "suspension"-* as Monticello would lead you to beleive.
The law that is definitive in "Roy" is that the Court did rule

-page seventhat the defendant was entitled to the rights and priviledges
granted by his "home state" within other states in the Union,
particularly Indiana in that case.

III. The City of Monticello claims that Utah has the power to
suspend the "license" of a non-resident, and that they properly
did so in this case, Monticellclclaims that power under the "DriverT s
License Compact" (Sections 41-2-501 et seq. and tj@e "Non-residentT s
Violator Compact" (Sections 41-2-601

e

^ seq . )

If such power

was indeed established by those statutes, the definition of
"home state" found in Article ii §(b) of the "Drivers License
Compact" would not include the phrase "...HOME State, ...The
state which has issued and HAS THE POWER TO SUSPEND the. .license...f/
(emphasis added)

If other states than the "home state" were

intended to have such a power, then some indication of that
would have to be mentioned, which it!s not.

Clearly there is

nothing within the "Compact" to prohibit Utah from suspending
the license of a Wyoming resident because that prohibition is
already quite clearly laid out in the

U.S. Constitution Article

IV §1 and 2, and no further prohibition need be given, as the
legislature may not pass a law contrary to the U.S. Constitution.
It might be additionally noted here that nothing in the "Compact"
gave Utah that power either.
Mr. Christensen has not claimed any protection under the
Constitution of Wyoming, merely quoted from Wyoming?s Constitution
that Wyoming has indeed

admitted into the Union, which gave

it full entitlement, equal to the state of Utah, and gave it f s
residents the protection of the U. S. Constitution.

-page eightIf it is true that the City of Monticello did not introduce
into evidence the letter entitled "defendants Exhibit B n , as
the City has claimed, then Monticello has fail€e| to present
any evidence that Mr. Christensen!s license was ever suspended
ati all.

Therefore this case should have beeen dismissed long

ago.
The state of Utah does not have the power to suspend Mr.
Christensen!s license, but can inform Wyoming of conviction
of a crime which would result in Wyomings suspension of the
licenses under Wyoming statutes 31-7-124- & WS 31-9-204.

As

evidenced by the Abstract of Mr. Christensen1s License from
the state of Wyoming, Utah never did take the steps available
to acheive that suspension.

If they had, Wyoming would have

not only noted the commmnication, but would have suspended the
license too.

The abstract, however, lists his license status

as "clear".
Not only does Utah not have the power to arbitrarily suspend
the license of a non-resident licensed in his home state, it
did not properly take the steps neccessary to do so, in this
case.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Christensen has properly brought this issue before
this Court, and has properly argued both the Constitutionality
and the validity of the statute, in it's current application.
To decide that the State of Utah has the power to suspend a license
issued by any other state, would set a dangerous precedent in

-page n m e in law,
Mr. Christensen has not entered into this case frivolously
but boes firmly beleive in the issue he brings.

Therefore,

no costs can be taxed in this case pursuant to Rule 34 of

the

Utah Court of Appeals. ("No Cost will be taxed in a criminal
case").

Mr. Christensen wishes his conviction overturned and

his property (money) returned to him, with interest.
Respectfully submitted
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Lee Christensen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify tfejflfcfc a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Reply Brief was mailed to the opposing counsel, by placing four
copies in the U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to Lyle
Andereon, Monticello City Attorney, P.O. Box 275 MOnticello,
Utah on the

\ (r, day of Febuary, 1989-

